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Looking Again at Clarity in Philosophy: Writing as a shaper and sharpener of 
thought 
VALERIE HOBBS 
 
Abstract 
%U\DQ0DJHH¶VUHFHQWSDSHUµ&ODULW\LQ3KLORVRSK\¶DUJXHVWKDWLQVWHDGRIIRFXVLQJRQFODULW\DWWKH
sentence level, writers should emphasize formulating their ideas clearly before any writing takes place. In 
part using text-analysis of three well-NQRZQSKLORVRSKHUV,ZLOOXSKROG0DJHH¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWFOHDU
writing is not necessary in order to be considered a great philosopher. On the other hand, I will challenge 
his ideas regarding the relationship between language and cognition by reflecting on ways in which writing 
aids the development of ideas.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to reflect critically on some of %U\DQ0DJHH¶Vrecent 
assertions regarding the relative importance of different types of clarity in texts and the 
relationship between language and cognition1. In part using text analysis of three well-
known philosophers, I will argue that while achieving clarity at the sentence level is less 
iPSRUWDQWWKDQFODULW\RIRQH¶VLGHDVODQJXDJHLVQHYHUWKHOHVVDYDOXDEOHWRROLQVKDSLQJ
DQGVKDUSHQLQJRQH¶VFRJQLWLRQ 
 
It may seem inappropriate for a linguist to be commenting on what philosophers do. 
Certainly, disciplinary conventions constrain the way we think and write, even more so 
for new members who have yet to prove themselves and so must follow the rules of 
communication more strictly (for example, information structure, use of technical terms, 
use of personal pronouns, etc.). So linguists (and even different kinds of linguists) write 
and speak in ways different from philosophers. As I have argued elsewhere2, what is 
considered acceptable, what is considered clear language in one discourse community is 
often far from acceptable or clear in another. For example, experts from the field of 
organizational behavior identify abstract language and nominalization with clarity and 
precision, contrary to how these features are seen by other disciplines. Familiarity with a 
                                                 
1
 µ&ODULW\LQ3KLORVRSK\¶ Philosophy 89 (2014), 451-462. 
2
 µ$FFRXQWLQJIRUWKH*UHDW'ivide: Features of clarity in analytic philosophy jouUQDODUWLFOHV¶ Journal of 
English for Academic Purposes 15 (2014), 27-36. 
 
type of text and the type of language therein determines, to a large degree, how clear it is 
to the reader. $QGLQGHHGRQH¶VDELOLW\WRZULWHFOHDUO\DQGHIIHFWLYHO\LQRQHFRQWH[W
does not necessarily translate to another. Ask a linguist to present her work in a journal 
read primarily by philosophers, and she may fail to communicate clearly according to 
their standards. But despite the title of his paper, Clarity in Philosophy, Magee uses 
examples beyond this field and argues that his principles regarding clarity apply to every 
type of discourse. And so they are worth examining by members of various discourse 
communities. 
 
/HW¶VORRNfirst at a summary of three of his main points.  
1. Maximal clarity is achieved by attending to it at all levels, presentational and 
discursive, though presentational is primary. 
2. Before one puts pen to paper, one must grasp the presentational structure as a 
ZKROHµ7KLVPHDQVWKLQNLQJLWWKURXJKWRWKHERWWRPWRWKHSRLQWZKHUHRQHKDVD
complete grasp oILWVSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUH¶.3 Magee gives the example of 
Bertrand Russell, who describes the writing of his ideas as beginning after the 
production of ideas. Magee concedes that translating ideas to the page is more 
GLIILFXOWIRUPRVWWKDQIRU5XVVHOOEXWWKHSURFHVVRIWKLQNLQJWKURXJKRQH¶VLGHDV
and writing them down are distinct stages. 
3. The process in 2 ideally takes place in self-isolation. 
 
The first point counters much of the literature on clarity and so is worth our close 
attention. Magee identifies different types of clarity, arguing that priority be given to the 
level of clarity in presentational or content structure. He reasons that while a clear text is 
LPSRUWDQWDVLWFDQDOORZRQH¶VLGHDVWREHXQGHUVWRRGDQGFLUFXODWHGPRUHZLGHO\clarity 
in writing is not necessary in order to be a good thinker. While good philosophers are 
likely to be clear at the level of discursive (linguistic) structure, this is tertiary. Magee 
further divides discursive clarity into overall text structure and sentence-level clarity, 
though his primary interest is in contrasting presentational clarity with discursive clarity 
                                                 
3
 Op. cit. note 1, 454. 
 
at the sentence level since sentence level clarity seems to receive the most praise. 
&RQVLGHU1LFKRODV-ROO¶VPRGHORIGHIDXOWFODULW\4, which identifies four desirable 
elements of clarity in philosophy, only one of which, rigor, moves beyond the sentence 
level. Rigor enjoins hypotaxis and a logically valid argument but appears second in the 
model, after explication of terms, and Joll GRHVQ¶WSULRULWL]HDQ\HOHPHQWDERYHDQRWKHU  
 
Magee uses multiple well-known philosophers to illustrate the primacy of presentational 
clarity. He offers .DQW¶VCritique of Pure Reason as an example of poor sentence level 
clarity but excellent presentational clarity. Magee contrasts this with the work of Bertrand 
Russell, widely regarded as a model of clarity at all levels, and with that of Wittgenstein, 
whose workLQ0DJHH¶VRSLQLRQ achieves sentence-level but not discursive clarity5. 
:KLOH0DJHHGRHVQRWFODULI\H[DFWO\ZKDWKHPHDQVE\µOXFLG¶VHQWHQFHV1LFKRODV-ROO¶V
PRGHOKHOSVIOHVKWKLVRXW1RWH-ROO¶VDFFXVDWLRQWKDWµDQLQFUHDVLQJDPRXQWRI:HVWHUQ
philosophy, whether Analytical, Continental, or otherwise, is jargonistic and verbose and 
\LHOGVLPSUHFLVHXQULJRURXVWH[WV¶.6 The implication seems to be that those texts which 
avoid overuse of technical terms and embrace short sentences can achieve discursive 
clarity. Other means of achieving clarity identified among philosophers include avoiding 
long words where short words will do and using personal pronouns to differentiate 
otKHUV¶DUJXPHQWVIURPRQH¶VRZQ 
 
While we could most certainly add to this list of textual features which aid clarity, these 
four features are among the most commonly identified in the literature on clarity (and 
philosophical clarity, in particular) and offer us a good starting place. Using a corpus tool 
which identifies frequencies of features within a text, we can see the extent to which 
0DJHH¶VDUJXPHQW holds true for the philosophers he selects (see Table 1). Self-mention 
refers to use of personal pronouns, such as I, me, mine, myself. Average words per 
sentence (WPS) refers to length of sentence. Mean word length is self explanatory and 
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 1LFKRODV-ROOµ+RZ6KRXOG3KLORVRSK\%H&OHDU"/RDGHG&ODULW\'HIDXOW&ODULW\DQG$GRUQR¶Telos 
146 (2009), 73-95. 
5
 6RPHUHDGHUVDUHOLNHO\WRGLVDJUHHZLWK0DJHH¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHVHWKUHHSKLORVRSKHUV¶FODULW\RI
writing and of ideas. That aside, examining the textual features of these three very different writers helps 
the reader come to her own conclusions about the interplay between discursive and presentational clarity. 
6
 Op. cit. note 4, 80. 
 
helps understand how much a writer relies on long, technical words. Finally, standardized 
type token ratio (STTR) LVDZD\RIPHDVXULQJDWH[W¶VOH[LFDl variety. If the STTR is 
high, for example, in relation to other texts, the text uses a wider range of vocabulary and 
is likely to be relying more heavily on synonyms and technical terms rather than choosing 
one word and sticking with it. A text which displays discursive clarity (as defined in 
philosophy) would likely have a high frequency of self-mention, a low average WPS, a 
low mean word length, and a low STTR. For purposes of comparison, I have also 
included in Table 1 the results from a 70-article corpus of recent philosophy journal 
articles from 5 leading journals, identified by a Professor of Philosophy in the UK as 
analytic.  
 
 Self-
mention 
(per 1,000 
words) 
Average WPS 
(Words per 
sentence) 
Mean word 
length 
STTR 
(Standardised 
type token 
ratio) 
70 recent 
philosophy journal 
articles 
10.14 30.04 5 32.8 
Russell (The Basic 
Writings of 
Bertrand Russell) 
+discursive  
+ presentational 
9.76 24.37 4.65 40.482 
Wittgenstein 
(Investigations) 
+discursive 
(sentence-level) 
-presentational 
29.63 17 4.19 32.81 
Kant (Pure 
Reason)  
-discursive 
6.84 35.498 4.86 33.413 
+presentational 
Table 1: Features of sentence-level clarity in philosophical texts 
 
With regard to the first three textual features, all three writers behave as Magee might 
expect. 5XVVHOO¶VDQG:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VWH[WVXVHVHOI-mention frequently (Wittgenstein to an 
extraordinary level!), limit their words per sentence, and tend to use shorter words, 
contributing to greater discursive clarity. .DQW¶VZULting is more verbose, uses fewer 
personal pronouns, and has a higher mean word length, all of which limit discursive 
clarity.7 For STTR, the results are unexpected. 5XVVHOO¶VWH[W, the clearest according to 
Magee, has the highest amount of lexical variation. However, taken with the mean word 
length, we may tentatively conclude that this is not due to overuse of long words. With 
regard to the higher mean word length in the corpus of recent journal articles, perhaps 
Joll was right that philosophical writing is becoming more verbose. But this is a matter 
for another paper. 
 
2XUWH[WXDODQDO\VLVKDVXSKHOG0DJHH¶VSRLQWWKDWDSKLORVRSKHUGRHVQRWQHHGWR
conform to discursive clarity at the sentence-level in order to be considered a great 
philosopher. .DQW¶VDUJXDEO\Yerbose texts are still highly regarded by many for their 
ideas. On the other hand, the textual analysis has confirmed that Wittgenstein¶s sentences 
are significantly morHFOHDUO\ZULWWHQWKDQ.DQW¶VI will leave it to the reader to decide if 
Magee is corrHFWDERXW:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQDOFODULW\7KHTXHVWLRQ,ZLOOQRZWXUQ
to is whether or not it necessarily follows that the production of the written text, however 
clearly composed, is subordinate to that of the presentational structure. I contend that 
0DJHH¶VYLHZVon writing and cognition do not stand up to scrutiny. Points 2 and 3, 
presented at the start of this paper, are problematic, for several reasons. First, they are 
founded on a faulty view of writing, one based on the idea that you must first know what 
you are going to say before you write. Have the outline in your mind, plan beforehand, 
keep in control of your thoughts before they wander out of control. Peter Elbow 
VXPPDUL]HVWKLVYLHZDVIROORZVµ:KHQDPDQSHUIHFWO\XQGHUVWDQGVKLPVHOI
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 Different disciplines have different conceptions of clarity. In this paper,  as I mentioned earlier, I am 
referring only to clarity as defined within philosophy. 
DSSURSULDWHGLFWLRQZLOOJHQHUDOO\EHDWKLVFRPPDQGHLWKHULQZULWLQJRUVSHDNLQJ¶8 
Contrary to this view, there is much evidence from psychology and from research on 
composition that communication, in its various forms, helps to shape and sharpen 
thought. For instance, work by Huub van der Bergh and Gert Rijlaarsdam9 has shown that 
the probability of generating ideas increases during writing. The more one writes, the 
more his ideas develop. Through this meeting of cognition and language, the writer 
purifies his ideas. Berthoff10 calls this meeting the process of making sense of the world, 
the essence of thinking. ZiQD2¶/HDU\ZULWHVRIµthe need to see writing as part and parcel 
of the research journey rather than MXVWDQDFFRXQWRIWKDWMRXUQH\¶.11 John Bean discusses 
what he calls tKHµEURXLOORQVWDJH¶, µa writing process that begins as a journey into 
disorder, a making of chaos, out of which RQHHYHQWXDOO\IRUJHVDQHVVD\¶.12 Meaning is 
ZKDW\RXHQGXSZLWKDIWHU\RXEHJLQZULWLQJDQGUHZULWLQJµThink of writing then not as 
a way to transmit a message but as a way to grow and cook a messaJH¶13 
 
2QHFRXOGDUJXHEDVHGRQ0DJHH¶VH[DPSOHVRIVNLlled thinkers and writers, that only 
novices rely on language to formulate ideas. However, for many disciplinary expert 
writers, presentational structure is very rarely formed completely before writing begins. 
Instead, each draft drives the development of ideas. While notwithstanding the usefulness 
of brilliant models like Russell, people think and write in different ways. Some, referred 
to as Mozartians by Ronald Kellogg14, may take a linear approach, beginning with an 
extended period of reading and thinking before writing ideas down. This is the type of 
thinker and writer that Magee idealizes. However, others work in a recursive manner, 
using the page as an external extension of their mind, where they can list ideas, move 
them around, delete and add to them, all the while thinking and reading and rereading. 
                                                 
8
 µ7KH3URFHVVRI:ULWLQJ± *URZLQJ¶LQDialogue on Writing (ed.) Geraldine DeLuca, Len Fox, Mark-
Ameen Johnson, and Myra Kogen (Routledge, 2001), 141-156. 
9
  µ7he Dynamics of Idea Generation During Writing¶ in Writing and Cognition (ed.) Mark Torrance, Luuk 
van Vaes, and David Galbraith (Emerald Group Publishing, 2007), 125-150. 
10
 A. E. Berthoff, Forming/Thinking/Writing: The composing imagination (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden, 
1978). 
11
 =LQD2¶/HDU\7KH(VVHQWLDO*XLGHWR'RLQJ5HVHDUFK6DJH 
12
 John C. Bean, Engaging Ideas: The professor's guide to integrating writing, critical thinking, and active 
learning in the classroom (John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 18.  
13
 Peter Elbow, Writing without Teachers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 15.  
14
 µProfessional writing expertLVH¶ in The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 389-402. 
Kellogg calls these Beethovians. For both types of writers (and there are no doubt many 
more kinds), the act of writing down offers the mind a visualization, a physical shape to 
its ideas, which further stimulates the thinker and allows him to see new paths or holes in 
the existing path.  
 
Regarding point 3, writing and thinking processes are constrained by external factors, as 
Magee comments on with some disapproval. 0DJHH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHideal creative 
person in isolation who insists on his own needs over those of his family and friends 
GRHVQ¶WPHVKZLWKWKHPRre egalitarian society we enjoy today, where both men and 
women share responsibility for home and family. For example, while parents living 
together may take it in turns to carve out a space to think and write, practically speaking 
these times are often interrupted. A female colleague raising a child on her own speaks 
about waking in the night and scribbling thoughts on a pad, using every opportunity to 
record them. Certainly, many creative people and thinkers would love to have limitless 
space to reflect on, write down, and formulate new ideas. This is not the issue. Rather, 
most Mozartian writers GRQ¶WKDYHWKDWVSDFHDQGVR rely on aids such as writing, 
DUWLFXODWLQJRQH¶VWKRXJKWVWRDFROOHDJXHRUVSRXVH and scribbling in the middle of the 
night. Views which elevate pre-verbal cognition and disregard the value that writing has 
LQUHFRUGLQJWUDFNLQJDQGGHYHORSLQJRQH¶VWKRXJKWVSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHPLGVWRIWKH
stops and starts of a chaotic life, are unhelpful to modern academics.  
 
0DJHH¶VSLFWXUHRIthe isolated thinker also overlooks the collaborative nature of thinking 
and writing. I once sat under a Theology professor who began with a single thought in his 
class, which he wrote at the centre of the blackboard. He encouraged us then to begin 
unpacking, rephrasing, defending, and challenging this thought, which he then developed 
by adding ideas to the board, erasing some as we defeated them. We thought through our 
arguments using language, both oral and written, arriving at our presentational structure 
only at the end of the class. The thoughts and language of the group intersected. As 
Fulwiler writes, 
The words give concrete form to thought DQGVRPDNHLWPRUHUHDO7KLV«helps to 
translate everyday information and experience into understanding and action. We 
carry on conversations with friends in order to explain things to ourselves. We 
discuss the theme of Hamlet with a colleague to remind ourselves of what the play 
LVDERXW«,QVKRUWWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQEHWZHHQDUWLFXODWHVSHHFKDQGLQWHUQDO
symbolization produces shaped thought.15 
This is one of the most important benefits of sharing ideas at conferences, for example. 
The worst speakers are often those who talk as if to themselves and ignore the comments 
and questions from the audience or simply leave no time for them. Magee emphasizes the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIZULWLQJµZLWKFORVHDWWHQWLRQWRRWKHUV¶16, but this seems limited to, first, the 
ZULWHU¶VVXEMHFWLYHunderstanding of that reader, and second, communication of the 
already formed message. He overlooks the direct involvement of those readers in both the 
IRUPXODWLRQDQGZULWLQJGRZQRIRQH¶s ideas. A similar difference can be seen in the 
classic ±etic vs. ±emic approach to field research, the former involving primarily the 
perspective of the observer, the latter involving that of the subjecW¶VIn short, the isolated 
thinker cannot understand his audience and get their much needed feedback unless he 
comes out of isolation.  
 
One could argue that while Magee does at times generalize to a larger audience, his views 
on the relationship between writing and thinking reflect the unique task of the 
philosopher. This task typically involves thinking critically about problems, not reading 
DQGFROODWLQJUHOHYDQWILQGLQJVIURPH[LVWLQJUHVHDUFKWREXLOGRQH¶VDUJXPHQWDV is 
common in many other disciplines (including mine). I have even encountered the view 
within philosophy that writing is distastHIXOµDQXQIRUWXQDWHQHFHVVLW\¶17, a distorted 
version of a purer truth that exists in nonverbal form. Magee does not seem to share this 
negative view, as he articulates a fondness for beauty in texts. A highly experienced 
thinker and writer, he offers some useful advice regarding how to write clearly and 
DHVWKHWLFDOO\VDWLVI\LQJWH[WVIRURQH¶VDXGLHQFHQRWLQJµ:ULWHUVZKRFDUH passionately 
about clarity will care passionately about tertiary clarity, and will be involved in a 
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 7RE\)XOZLOHUµ:ULWLQJ$QDFWRIFRJQLWLRQ¶New Directions for Teaching and Learning 12 (1982), 15-
26. 
16
 Op. cit. note 1, 458. 
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 5LFKDUG5RUW\µ3KLORVRSK\DVD.LQGRI:ULWLQJ$QHVVD\RQ'HUULGD¶New Literary History (1978), 
141-160. 
 
struggle with language aimed at lucidity of verbal expression¶18 Nevertheless, separating 
thought and language, a view confined not just to philosophy historically but to much of 
academia, has links to a positivist perspective wherein language is inferior, an 
afterthought to cognition. What I have tried to show here is that putting thoughts to words 
can itself be a form of inquiry, whatever the discipline, whilst acknowledging that the 
particular choice of words is less important than the ideas themselves.  
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